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Summary 
We study the broken windows theory with a field experiment in a shared area of a workplace 
in academia (department common room). We explore academics’ and postgraduate 
students’ behaviour under an order condition (clean environment) and a disorder condition 
(messy environment). We find strong support that signs of disorderly behaviour triggers 
littering. In the disorder treatment 59% of the subjects litter compared to 18% in the order 
condition. The results remain robust when controlling compared to previous studies for a 
large set of factors in a multivariate analysis. When academic staff members and 
postgraduate students observe that others violated the social norm of keeping the common 
room clean the probability of littering increases ceteris paribus by around 40 percent. 
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We study the broken windows theory with a field experiment in a shared area of a workplace in 
academia (department common room). We explore academics’ and postgraduate students’ behaviour 
under an order condition (clean environment) and a disorder condition (messy environment). We find 
strong support that signs of disorderly behaviour triggers littering. In the disorder treatment 59% of 
the subjects litter compared to 18% in the order condition. The results remain robust when 
controlling compared to previous studies for a large set of factors in a multivariate analysis. When 
academic staff members and postgraduate students observe that others violated the social norm of 
keeping the common room clean the probability of littering increases ceteris paribus by around 40 
percent.  
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Understanding what triggers antisocial and petty criminal behaviour is important to 
developing better communities. The broken windows theory (BWT) states that “signs of 
inappropriate behaviour like graffiti or broken windows lead to other inappropriate behaviour 
(e.g. litter or stealing)” (Keizer et al. 2008, p.1685). The theory has strongly influenced law 
enforcement strategies in several US cities such as New York, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston 
and Los Angeles aiming at maintaining order by dealing more aggressively with minor 
offenses (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006). However, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) criticise that 
despite the widespread policy influence “remarkably little is known about the effects of 
broken windows” (p. 272). Some contributions contend that the enthusiasm for the broken-
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Lorenz Goette.  windows strategy is problematic (Taylor 2000; Harcourt 2001). Moderate effects that were 
not robust were found by Sampson and Raudenbush (1999). Using data from a social 
experiment where low-income families living in communities with high rates of social 
disorder were randomly assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and 
disorderly communities, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) provide no support for the BWT. On 
the other hand, in a recent field experiment Keizer's et al. (2008) provides evidence 
supporting the theory.  
Currently we observe not only a limited amount of empirical studies but also mixed 
results. Additionally, to date research into BWT has been criticised for being largely 
correlational and failing to provide concrete causal evidence (Keizer et al. 2008, p. 1681). 
This suggests the usefulness of working with an experimental approach. Moreover, one 
should note that BWT has previously been applied in shared public settings or 
neighbourhoods where people live, but not in a smaller more enclosed environment such as 
the workplace. In this paper we are therefore interested in testing in a controlled field 
experiment whether the BWT can be applied to a quasi-private enclosed setting (office 
lunchroom) in the work environment using a homogenous group of individuals, namely 
academics. Collective-action problems may arise and such problems are related to the notion 
of conditional cooperation (for experimental evidence see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001 and 
Falk and Fischbacher 2002). 
It is not only useful to analyse the question in a field experimental setting, but also to 
focus on a homogenous group such as academics as it has been criticised that the differences 
across neighbourhoods are driven by unobservable individual characteristics related to the 
residents of the neighbourhood and the problems of self-selection of individuals in such 
neighbourhoods (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006). Demographic factors, changes in drugs 
markets, organizational reforms within the police department, an increased incarceration or a 
reduction of unemployment could also have contributed to the crime drop (Harcourt 2001). 
Thus, several previous studies lack control over the population and were therefore not able to 
isolate potential composition effects (e.g., specific group of individuals may change their 
acting place when the environment is messy).  
 
II. METHOD 
To test these ideas we conducted a small field experiment at the School of Economics and 
Finance at the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane (Australia). Being members of the School provided us with the opportunity to control and test for the impact of several 
variables that previous studies have neglected due to lack of observability and allowed us to 
be sure that subjects were not aware of being involved in such a field experiment. The setting 
was the common room that is shared by almost all academic members of the School. Subjects 
were all people utilising the common room between the hours of 12 pm and 1 pm, i.e. during 
lunch time. The experiment was conducted in May 2009. The strength of such a field 
experiment is that subjects are acting in the natural environment instead of an artificial 
laboratory environment. It has been shown that experiments performed in an environment 
where the test subjects are keenly aware that their behaviour is being monitored are prone to 
change their normal behaviour such that it is difficult to generalize the results (Levitt and List 
2009). 
Following in a similar fashion to Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008), we 
distinguished between a contextual norm and a target norm and manipulated the indications 
that the contextual norm was violated. We can define the contextual norm which the 
participant witnessed having been violated and the target norm which the participant violates 
themselves. Our dependent variable was whether a user of the common room violated the 
target norm. We define a disorder condition (treatment group) as one where the contextual 
norm is violated and the order condition (control group) as one where it is not. We predicted 
participants would violate the target norm more frequently in the presence of a contextual 
norm violation. The common room is cleaned every morning and so is generally maintained 
clean and orderly leading up to lunchtime (see Figure 1). Clean cutlery, crockery, and 
drinking glasses are stored in the common room cabinets and it is expected that any used 
wares are placed in the School’s dishwasher (in the same room) for later washing. This 
behaviour, we assert, can be regarded as the injunctive norm or the most appropriate 
behaviour in this situation. Hence, any participant not placing used common room utensils, 
plates, etc. in the dishwasher was considered to have ‘littered’. 
For our disorder condition, we manipulated the indications that the contextual norm 
was being violated (placing used cutlery, crockery, and drinking glasses in the common room 
sink). To further reinforce the disorder condition, we made the common room generally 
untidy by spreading newspapers, magazines etc. around the room, and leaving sugar packets 
around the common room, and placing litter on floor near the rubbish bin (see Figure 2) 
hence making it immediately noticeable that the room was messier than usual. This 
established evidence of a cross-norm inhibition effect where not placing cutlery in the 
dishwasher fosters the violation of norms regarding the tidiness of the room.   
Figure 1 and 2 about here 
 
III. RESULTS 
In both treatments, the order treatment (ORDER, tidy common room) and the disorder 
condition (DISORDER, untidy common room) we obtained 49 observations. Of the 
participants in the order condition, 18% ‘littered’ compared with 59% of the subjects in the 
disorder condition (see Figure 3). A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
indicates that the difference between order and disorder condition is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level (z = –4.125). 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
However, the descriptive analysis only gives us information about the raw effects and not the 
partial effects. Thus, we test whether the difference remains statistically significant using a 
multivariate analysis. We use a probit model due to the non-linear and binary nature of the 
dependant variable. The dependant variable in this analysis is a variable used to indicate 
whether individuals were littering (value 1) or not (value 0). We also calculate the marginal 
effects at the multivariate point of means to find the quantitative effect of an independent 
variable.  
Table 1 presents the results. In specification (1) we only use DISORDER as an 
independent variable. In a next step we add socio-demographic factors such as gender and 
age and job characteristics, namely whether the person has an economic (ECONOMIST=1) 
or finance background or is a staff (ACADEMIC STAFF=1) or postdoctoral student. Next, in 
specification (3) we add a variable PEOPLE PRESENT that allows to measure whether the 
litter behaviour changes with the number of individuals in the room. As a further robustness 
check we present in specification (4), (5) and (6) a further group of specifications where 
standard errors by subjects are clustered, since clustering picks up unobserved individual-
specific characteristics. In specification (5) we also control with two dummy variables 
whether there is a “Monday” or “Friday” effect as the field experiment was conducted over a 
period of six days. Finally, in specification (6) we control for the POSITION (RANK) of the 
subjects (1=Postgraduate student; 2=Postdoctoral Fellow, Lecturer, Senior Lecturer; 
3=Associate Professor, Professor). The results show a robust picture that is consistent with previous results. The 
coefficient of our variable DISORDER is always statistically significant (mostly at the 1% 
level). The marginal effects are also quite large. Being in a disorder situation increases ceteris 
paribus the probability of littering between 26 and 45%. The results also show that 
individuals AGE 50 AND MORE are more likely to litter than our reference group (AGE 
BELOW 30) reporting also large marginal effects (around 60%). We also observe the 
tendency that a large amount of individuals in the room discourage littering which supports 
previous evidence of conditional norm violating behaviour. However, the coefficient is not 
always statistically significant. There is also the tendency of a Monday effect. It seems to 
help spending the weekend at home where one may have difficulties littering. Finally, more 
senior staff members are more likely to litter, although one should note that the coefficient is 
only statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The novelty of this study is to use a small controlled field experiment in a shared area of a 
workplace in academia (common room) to explore whether the broken windows theory helps 
to explain littering behaviour. The evidence strongly suggests that the presence of signs of 
disorder in the common room lead to a substantial increase in the probability of subjects 
violating the contextual norm (‘littering’). The descriptive analysis shows that in the disorder 
treatment 59% of the subjects litter compared to 18% in the order condition. The strength of 
this study is also to be able to control, compared to previous studies, for a set of independent 
factors in a multivariate analysis. The statistically significant difference between control and 
treatment group remains in such a multivariate analysis. When academics observe that others 
violated the social norm of keeping the common room clean the probability of littering 
increases ceteris paribus by around 40 percent. The results therefore suggest that preventing 
signs of disorders is an effective method of maintaining the workplace common room in a 
satisfactory state.  
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Figure 1: Order condition 
 
 


































































INDEPENDENT FACTORS          
           
DISORDER    1.134*** 1.280*** 1.067*** 1.067***  0.737**  0.809*** 
    (4.11) (4.01) (3.14) (3.93)  (2.50)  (2.95) 
   0.408 0.453 0.381 0.381  0.259  0.284 
            
MALE    -0.277 -0.284 -0.284  -0.228  -0.251 
     (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.69)  (-0.48)  (-0.52) 
     -0.105 -0.107 -0.107  -0.083  -0.092 
            
ECONOMIST    -0.272 -0.319 -0.319  -0.289  -0.186 
     (-0.75) (-0.86) (-0.73)  (-0.60)  (-0.37) 
     -0.104 -0.121 -0.121  -0.106  -0.068 
            
ACADEMIC STAFF    0.425 0.611 0.611  0.563   
     (1.20) (1.63) (1.62)  (1.33)   
     0.160 0.228 0.228  0.203   
           
AGE 30-39    0.164  0.089  0.089  -0.108  -0.206 
     (0.44)  (0.23)  (0.18)  (-0.21)  (-0.39) 
     0.062 0.033 0.033  -0.038  -0.072 
            
AGE 40-49    -0.589 -0.654 -0.654 -0.861*  -0.911* 
     (-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.35)  (-1.71)  (-1.77) 
     -0.199 -0.215 -0.215  -0.253  -0.264 
           
AGE 50 AND MORE    1.599***  1.719***  1.719***  1.758***  1.692*** 
     (3.28)  (3.41)  (3.41)  (3.38)  (3.35) 
     0.571 0.604 0.604  0.619  0.601 
            
PEOPLE PRESENT     -0.155*  -0.155  -0.177*  -0.164 
      (-1.89)  (-1.58)  (-1.72)  (-1.64) 
     -0.057 -0.057  -0.063 -0.059 
          
 MONDAY        -1.223*  -1.195** 
        (-1.96)  (-1.99) 
         -0.342 -0.337 
            
  FRIDAY       0.391  0.345 
        (1.43)  (1.44) 
            0.145 0.128 
             
POSITION  (RANK)                 0.532* 
            (1.67) 
            0.191 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo  R2  0.137 0.286 0.315 0.315  0.373  0.380 
# of observations  98  98  98  98  98  98 
Notes: z- values in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. In the reference group: ORDER TREATMENT, 
FEMALE, FINACE, POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS, AGE BELOW 30, TUESDAY-THURSDAY. NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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